stationed in Afghanistan) and killed many civilians, the Taliban has not been banned by Pakistan or the US as a terrorist organisation. This could partly be because the authorities in Pakistan and the US still consider the Taliban as a force that can be moulded to serve their ends in Afghanistan. Perhaps mindful of the historical context in which the Taliban rose as a militant Islamist movement in Afghanistan after the successful ''Jihad'' against Soviet occupation between 1979 and 1988, the Taliban is viewed as a natural heir of Islamist radicalism unleashed during this period. Were it not for its truck with Al Qaeda, it would still be regarded as a localised phenomenon which the world could ignore and get used to.
However, now that the Taliban has made its presence felt in Pakistan, authorities there have taken serious note of its intentions and ability to pose a critical challenge to internal security of Pakistan. In fact, the emergence of a shadowy group called the ''Pakistani Taliban' and their continuing links with the Afghan Taliban has embarrassed the leadership in Pakistan. That the Taliban had a Pakistani coordinate was well known. But it was largely regarded as a force operating outside Pakistan. The prospect of having to contend with such a radical force at the internal level has disturbed the security calculus in Pakistan.
The case of pro-Taliban militants laying siege on the Red Mosque at the heart of the Pakistani capital, in February 2007, until they were flushed out through military action, along with the rising incidence of suicide attacks against security forces in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the spread of the influence of the Taliban beyond the tribal areas in recent years, suggest that the Taliban phenomenon will affect Pakistan for a prolonged period and warrants a deeper analysis of the malaise that is affecting the Pakistani state at the moment.
The Afghan Taliban
Most of the analysts of the Taliban phenomenon explain it away as an aftereffect of the Afghan Jihad. It was indeed a movement of the students (Taliban means student in Arabic/Urdu) from the religious seminaries in Pakistan who sought a way out of the civil war that raged in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan between 1988 and 1994. 3 They made their presence felt around Maiwand and marched to Kandahar in 1994, making it the nucleus of the Taliban movement. Active patronage from Pakistani intelligence boosted the morale of the movement as it spread into other areas of Afghanistan and swept into the capital city of Kabul in 1996. The Taliban was viewed by many as a better alternative to the tribal warlords and a host of warring militant groups seeking to establish their writ in Afghanistan. While the US watched it all from a distance, it silently assented in the hope of bringing peace to Afghanistan through a promising student militia who also enjoyed immense popular backing in the initial years of their triumph.
However, as soon as the Taliban settled in Kabul, they revealed their conservative orientation and their rigid, inflexible and illiberal interpretation of Quran which formed the core of their rule in Afghanistan. Their leader Mullah Omar, who was soon seen to be allying himself with Osama Bin Laden of Al Qaeda, became the Amir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful) and his writ became law in Afghanistan. The Taliban sought to impose a strict version of Islam 4 and turn Afghanistan into a laboratory of Jihad. It reversed the trend of progressive social reconstruction attempted by the communists during the Soviet occupation. Men were forced to grow beards and pray five times a day. Barbers were asked to close down their shops. Women were barred from working in public offices and forced to wear the veil, stay home, and not to appear in public places unescorted by men. Dance and music were banned. Islamic systems of punishment were introduced and public executions became common place. A specific department, called the Amr bil Ma'ruf wa Nahy an al Munkar (Department of Promotion of Virtue and Eradication of Vice) was established in Kabul in December 1996 to ensure the observation of Islamic practices.
The Taliban spread from the Pashtun majority areas in the South to areas dominated by other ethnic minorities such as the Hazaras (mostly Shias), Uzbeks and Tajiks. The Taliban storm raged through these areas, through force and fraud, with active participation from both the Pakistani State 5 and nonstate actors 6 between 1996 and 2000. Excepting in the Panjsir valley, the Taliban controlled most other areas by early 2001.
The threat of sanctions and prolonged economic isolation by the wider international community did not help as Afghanistan became increasingly isolated and a haven for Islamist extremists, closer in orientation to the Deobandi-Wahabi version of Islam and a training ground for jihad for radicals from all corners of the world. The attacks on the twin towers on September 11, 2001 made the world realise the extent of the forces Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden had raised in their Islamist laboratory in Afghanistan.
The subsequent US led attack on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, for harbouring Al Qaeda terrorists, began in October 2001, and the Taliban fled from Kabul. Steady streams of Taliban and Al Qaeda militants trickled into the tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. These militants, multi-national in character*/ Afghan, Arab, Pakistani, Chechen, Uzbek, and Uyighur */ had fought in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, Afghans and Pakistanis constituted a majority of these forces. While many of the Taliban forces stayed within the tribal areas, Al Qaeda elements spread across the length and breadth of Pakistan The Taliban were the products of the Deobandi religious seminaries (Madrassas) which dotted the Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan along the borders. Madrassas also mushroomed in the Punjab and Sindh too. In fact, the Banuri mosque of Karachi played a leading role in the Afghan jihad. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan, the USA and Saudi Arabia had promoted the establishment of these seminaries and designed special curricula for ideological indoctrination of Afghan refugee children, mindful of the Jihad raging in Afghanistan.
While Jamiat-i-Islami (JI) enjoyed prime patronage under the Zia-ul-Haq regime to mobilise support for the Jihad, and was a major voice in deciding which groups Islamabad would support, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) was busy setting up Madrassas for educating the young Afghans and preparing them for the Jihad. 8 Once the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and the mujahideen came to power, the the Pakistani intelligence agencies failed in their attempt to bring all groups together and Afghanistan was plagued by internecine feuds until the rise of the Taliban in 1994. As the Taliban gained popularity, it attracted material and moral help from the Pakistani establishment, enabling it to bring the entire state under its control. It was then that the JUI of Pakistan overtook JI as the main mediating political group in Pakistan between the Pakistani State and the Taliban. Most of the top leadership of the Taliban were educated in Pakistani madrassas controlled by the JUI. JI was not as madrassa-centred as JUI and the latter was in charge of almost 80 per cent of the madrassas in Pakistan by the 1990s.
The JUI-Taliban relationship continued to grow even if the JUI suffered a split in 1990 over the issue of its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman supporting the Benazir Bhutto-led government. Maulana Shami-ul-Haq broke away from JUI and founded his own branch after his name, i.e, JUI(S). After being overthrown in 1991, Benazir made a come-back in 1993. It was then that her government decided to back the Taliban. Maulana Fazlur Rehman's faction of the JUI played an important role in developing this strategic relationship between Pakistani intelligence and the Taliban. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, whose madrassa at Akora Khattak, called the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, claimed to have produced the most Taliban cadres, also joined this partnership. As the Taliban became more entrenched there was a fringe Islamist element in Pakistan, produced by these madrassas and fired with the Jihad ideal, which started demanding Taliban type rule in Pakistan.
One was Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who founded his Tehreek Nifaz Shariate-Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1992, and launched a formal movement for the imposition of Taliban style rule in Pakistan. By NovemberÁDecember 1994, TNSM had started asserting itself with thousands of its armed supporters seeking to impose Sharia in the Malakand division in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. In 1995, its followers occupied government offices in the Swat district and demanded the imposition of Sharia in the area. On September 6, 1998, in reaction to the August 1998 American missile attacks on Afghanistan, the TNSM threatened to attack American citizens and property in Pakistan unless the USA apologised to the Muslim world for its missile strikes. Later on October 27, 2001, about 10,000 TNSM cadres from Bajaur, led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed and heavily armed with Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, hand-grenades and swords, crossed the Pakistan-Afghan border to join the ranks of the Taliban in their fight against the US-led forces.
The pressure from the religious elements was so great on the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that in 1998 he introduced the fifteenth amendment to the Pakistani constitution . . . Clause 2 of this proposed Article states:
The Federal Government shall be under an obligation to take steps to enforce the Shariah, to establish salat, to administer zakat, to promote amr bil ma'roof and nahi anil munkar (to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong), to eradicate corruption at all levels and to provide substantial socio-economic justice, in accordance with the principles of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 9 The bill was passed in the lower house on October 8, 1998. But it was not presented to the upper house because Nawaz Sharif's party did not have the required majority there. It is rumoured that the Prime Minister was waiting for the day when he would have a majority in the upper house to get it passed as an affirmation of his devotion to Islam. In reality it was an attempt to steal the thunder of the religious political parties. However, in practical terms Pakistan had moved closer to the Taliban version of Islam by then.
There was also the case of Mulana Akram Awan of Chakwal, Shiekh of the Naqshbandiah Owaisiah order, threatening to lay siege on Rawalpindi in April 2001 demanding imposition of Sharia in Pakistan. He was supported by Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, the retired General who had planned a coup in 1995 and subsequently been sentenced to imprisonment later that year, and the late Azam Tariq, the Deobandi-Sunni leader of Sipah-e-Sahaba. General Musharraf had to negotiate with the Maulana and assure him that he would try to accommodate his demands in lieu of the former pulling out his men from Rawalpindi. Musharraf also tried to co-opt and win Azam Tariq's allegiance by helping him get elected to the National Assembly. Despite Azam Tariq's 
The Roots of Talibanisation
The roots that sustain Islamist demands for the establishment of the rule of Sharia in Pakistan ironically lie in official Islam, championed by the Pakistani state. The following analysis indicates the Pakistani state has been under pressure from the right wing ulema (religious scholars) since its inception to convert the western-derived elements of the Pakistani state to a Sharia-based Islamic system. The modernist elite in Pakistan has, over time, conceded to Islamist demands, in order to avoid any confrontation and to reduce the chances of the Islamists making political gains. However, such a bargain has proved counter productive, pushing the State further down the Islamization path.
Pakistan was carved out of British India for the minority Muslims concerned about the prospect of being marginalised by the majority Hindu population. The leadership of the movement for Pakistan, mostly from northern India and elitist and feudal in orientation, used Islam in their mobilisation strategy to attract the Muslim masses. During the course of the movement, the bogey of Islamic-culture-in-danger was also raised to elicit stronger mass support and by the time of the creation of Pakistan, Islam had become a unifying element for the Muslims. However, once the state of Pakistan came into being, its main architect, and its sole spokesman, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who claimed to have carved it with the help of a type-writer, underplayed the Islamic dimension and defined the basic institutions of the state in liberal and secular terms. However, he passed away exactly 1 year and 29 days after Pakistan's creation, before the constitution was drawn up enshrining the principles he outlined in his address to the nation on August 11, 1947 . 10 The leaders succeeding him were unable to contend with the Islamist forces that were encouraged during the movement for Pakistan. ''What was the need of founding Pakistan if it were to be a secular one? '' 11 , asked some of the conservative right wing leaders. As the debate on the nature of the Pakistani state gathered momentum in the Pakistani Constitutional Assembly, it soon became apparent in the ''Objective Resolution'' 12 of the Pakistani Constitution in 1949 that Islam had entered the constitution as an unalterable frame of reference. 13 Even secular leaders like Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto had to insert 'Islamic provisions' 14 in the constitutions enacted during their rule.
Islamisation leads to Talibanisation
Article 2 of the 1973 constitution declares Islam as the official state religion and the preamble emphasises the point that sovereignty belongs to Allah. Article 227 states that all ''existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the holy Qur'aan and Sunnah . . . and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions'' (Article 227). The ulema (Islamic scholars) have played an officially recognised role in shaping the Pakistani polity, including the writing of legislation.
The clergy has been accorded a constitutional place through the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). The CII was first introduced by Field Marshall Ayub in his 1962 constitution and Ayub used his influence and discretion to select only conformist clerics who would adopt a modernist line and attest his policies. The constitution of 1973 also made constitutional provision for the CII with a constitutional mandate to examine existing laws and recommend ways of bringing them into conformity with Islam's injunctions. The constitution promised to make all laws conform to the principles of Islam within ten years from the promulgation of the constitution. While Z.A. Bhutto did not make any effort in this regard, the damage had been done and the CII continues as a body prescribing conservative steps to be taken by governments from time to time. This has exerted unnecessary pressure on the government that at times has made use of the recommendations of the CII to demonstrate their Islamic credentials.
During Zia-ul-Haq's rule, the CII worked most enthusiastically and served as Chief Advisory Council to the President, entrusted with the responsibility of examining whether federal and provincial laws were in line with Islamic principles. So far the CII has recommended repeal of 829 federal laws passed till 1977. 15 Many more laws are currently under review. As a result of their influence, Islamisation is, at least formally, the ultimate objective of the constitution and the basis of the state's legitimacy.
The attempt at Islamisation did not stop there. Zia-ul-Haq added Sharia benches to Provincial courts and a Sharia appellate bench to the Federal Supreme Court to decide matters concerning Islamic laws. These came to be known as the Federal Shariat Court. Sharia education was added to university education and an International Islamic University was established to offer judges crash courses on Islamic jurisprudence, to train official mullahs, and to emphasise research on Islamic history, politics and economics. During Zia's time, Islamisation efforts even spread to the criminal justice system. The penal laws, criminal procedure and Evidence Act were also amended through Presidential decrees/ordinances eroding the legal status of women.
Zia's infamous Hudood ordinances sought to introduce medieval forms of punishment like flogging, amputation, public stoning etc. With such symbolic but pervasive Islamisation efforts the non-Muslim minorities were reduced to 'dhimmis' 16 of the medieval age. Even if the constitution gave them rights to profess and practice their religion, in practice there was an overwhelming majoritarian bias against minority sects like Ahmadiyas. 17 In some cases, the Christians were targeted through blasphemy laws brought in by Zia.
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It has been very difficult to repeal these Islamising provisions in Pakistan, as can be seen in the efforts by Musharraf to moderate some provisions of the Hudood ordinance to protect the rights of the women. It took Musharraf almost eight years to venture into the terrain of the Mullahs over the issue of restoring some women's rights, encroached upon by the Islamist incursions during the Zia era, signifying a gradual Islamisation of the Pakistani state and society.
Interpretations
The state with its modern trappings and liberal leadership has found it difficult to fight the menace of Islamic radicalism and progressively the conservative lobby has advanced. One interpretation could be that politics in Pakistan is dominated by a minority group consisting of the political, military and bureaucratic elite which is drawn from the feudal class or, as Hamza Alavi has suggested, from the elite salariat 18 Due to the slow pace of socio-economic development of the Pakistani society and the apathy of the ruling elite towards the issue of creating equal conditions for people to make social, economic and political mobility possible, the political system in Pakistan is under strain from many sources.
Elite Competition?
One plausible explanation for the Islamic clergy's desire for political power could be their social composition. Ever since Pakistan was established a large majority of the clergy came from the less prestigious social classes, unlike the anglicised elite which invariably came largely from the feudal class. It was calculated by the famous Pakistani economist, the late Mahbub ul Haq in the mid-1980s that the ruling class in Pakistan was an exclusive group consolidated through inter-linkages and confined to around 500 families. Apart from few leaders like Qazi Hussain Ahmed, most of the mullahs have humble origins and come from poorer areas of Pakistan. 19 At a certain level it can be interpreted as elite competition. Due to the unavailability of a consensual system of elite circulation (whereby different sets of elite could change their positions at the top in a peaceful manner), they have found it strategic to assert themselves through mobilisation of popular constituencies around the theme of Islam-which has high emotive value given the socio-economic backwardness of the people. However, this is not to deny that competitive elite networking has made complex alliances possible and at times the weakest group, with nuisance value and illegitimate coercive power, has been seen to ally itself with the military elite in its quest for state power. It has also been observed that this orthodox elite (the mullahs for instance) has been very entrepreneurial and made good use of their small but vocal and assertive power-base to keep themselves in circulation. The fact that the most prominent among these conservative elites have been vulnerable to opportunistic offers, suggest that their success has been in direct proportion to the willingness of the ruling elite of the time to accommodate them. 20 The stakes of the Mullah
The mullah-military nexus 21 which has been the theme of extensive research both in and outside Pakistan, has made it tempting on the part of the military elite, which has been one of the important constituents of state power, to make use of the militant religious constituency in designing its foreign and domestic policy. During the post-Afghan-Jihad days the use-value of this constituency increased substantially and the military-dominated Pakistani state incorporated its preferences into its Kashmir policy vis-a`-vis India and in the bargain tolerated the intense Sunni-Deobandi sectarian implications at the domestic level. There was little realisation that these elements would come home to roost. By the 1990s it was seen that they had indeed made their presence felt in the tribal belt in Pakistan.
There is another element to militant Islam that has adopted the Taliban model in Pakistan over the last decade. It has nested itself in the Pashtun majority tribal areas in and around the federally administered tribal areas and northern Baluchistan. Projecting themselves as the Pakistani Taliban they have posed a tough challenge to Musharraf and the American forces in this virtually unadministered terrain. They have also managed to spread into the adjoining areas but with limited success and failed to penetrate into the Punjab and even Sindh provinces, despite having a working base in Karachi facilitated by their sectarian cousins. They have made inroads into Islamabad, as was witnessed in the wake of the Red Mosque siege. It became possible to penetrate into the capital, Islamabad, due to the gradual spread of jihadi mosques during General Zia's reign. Moreover, the leaders of these orthodox outfits, both militant and moderate, have come from the Pashtun ethnic group. Fears are growing that if Pakistan does not resolve its internal Taliban problem it may even encounter Pashtun-religious opposition in NWFP and northern Baluchistan. The recent resolution in the provincial assembly in NWFP to rename the province as ''Afghania'', must have instilled some fear into the administration.
Strains in the Mullah-Military Alliance
The current military-led government has tried to underplay the role of Islam in the institutions of the Pakistani state. However, it is well-known that it had struck a deal with religious forces before the elections in October 2002 and played a big role in bringing disparate conservative political groups together to form the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, better known as the MMA, (literally translated as the United Council of Action), a grand coalition of religious-political parties including Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahle Hadith Sunni groups as well as Shias.
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The government of the day, committed to ''enlightened moderation'', has tried to engage the religious forces through dialogue, discussions and negotiations over issues spanning from the women's protection bill to deals with tribal Islamist militants. Even if this has not ensured smooth relations between the establishment and the MMA, the uneasy cohabitation has at least helped the government in maintaining a democratic façade. It has also helped the MMA in influencing the behaviour of the government in many ways.
If one analyses the several rounds of negotiations that Chaudhury Sujaat Hussain (President of the ruling political party, the Pakistan Muslim LeagueQuaid-e-Azam) had with the JUI-F leader Fazlur Rehman, one finds that the original draft of the bill was substantially diluted to accommodate the wishes of the MMA leadership. Even then the MMA was opposed to the deal. The situation, as it remains to date, favours the military led government, yet the Mullahs have the power to influence the decisions of the government especially in matters concerning issues around social reform, gender rights, madrassa education and religious issues.
In certain ways, tacit governmental patronage has also boosted the morale of the MMA to the extent of passing a Shariat bill in the NWFP provincial Assembly, similar to the 15 th amendment initiated by Nawaz Sharif, discussed earlier. 22 At another level, the MMA, by acting as a buffer between the government and the Islamist militants, has provoked the ire of the extremists. Despite their willingness to work with the military during different periods of Pakistan's history, the religious-political forces had managed to retain their support base in these areas. But this time, with the appearance of ultra-radical conservative forces, the hold of the MMA over the Pashtun-dominated areas may weaken. Alternately, sensing the popular pulse in these areas, the MMA may seek to disassociate from the ruling establishment and raise its Islamisation bogey all over again. The resignation of the JI chief Qazi Hussain in July 2007 is an indication of a widening fault line within the MMA over whether or not to support Musharraf's policies in Pakistan.
Is roll-back possible?
There is a liberal argument that the Islamist tenor of the current constitution is more apparent than real. In essence, the government chosen by the people of the State, is the sovereign entity in Pakistan, for Allah had delegated all his authority to Pakistan. Such an argument is often advanced by the liberal constituency in Pakistan who claim that the silent majority of Pakistan are against a militant version of Islam and that the plurality within Islam in Pakistan would act as a defence against any move by any one version to dominate the polity in Pakistan. It is also argued by many Pakistani liberals that the largest province of Pakistan, the Punjab, will never come under the spell of any such regressive force and will serve as a uniting force in Pakistan.
However, such sanguine analysis is undermined by the state conceding space to such regressive forces, even symbolically. The dominant elite of Pakistan needs to redefine state institutions in liberal terms in order to keep Islam out of the affairs of the State. The State, rather than working on how to make good Muslims, ought to devote more time to liberal education, genuine reform of existing madrassas and open up the political domain to allow the militant forces to battle it out in the game of electoral politics, which will effectively deter their enthusiasm and appeal. A closed political system with doctored elections and unrepresentative rulers is a recipe for disaster. If the state makes an effort to contain Islamic extremists through force alone, it may create a situation quite similar to the those in Algeria, Turkey and even Indonesia.
Aware of the political value of Islam, General Musharraf has emphasised a liberal interpretation of Islam. In the negotiations with the Maulanas of the Red Mosque, it was reported that the government had tried to soften the stand of the Maulanas by expressing its commitment to work towards a Sharia-based political system in Pakistan. Shujaat Hussain and Ejaj-ul Haq (the late ZiaulHaq's son), the mediators, emphasised that there was unanimity of opinion between the Government and the Maulanas regarding the evolution of a Shariabased system in Pakistan, but that the methods could be different. In fact, as far as the orientation of the government is concerned there seems to be a tremendous reservoir of sympathy for the Islamist position among many politicians belonging to the ruling faction, even if President General Musharraf might be singing a different tune.
It has to be re-emphasised here that even if the rise of the Pakistani Taliban has made the JUI and even the JI*/ the principal Sunni political parties within MMA, look like moderates, there is basic agreement between the two regarding the need to have Islamic Sharia-based rule in Pakistan. The moderating effects of participation in the democratic political process wears off once they lose government patronage. The temptation to bring in Islamic rule through coercion is always present among enthusiastic supporters at the grassroots level and this constituency will continue to provide the necessary oxygen for the pro-Taliban Islamist militancy in the tribal belt. The Pakistani state faces a long struggle, as far as fighting these elements are concerned. It may be true that such militancy may not exert disintegrative pressure on the Pakistani state. However, given the close nexus between the Taliban and other types of extremists like the Deobandi Sunni sectarian elements and Kashmiri militants within Pakistan, the very possibility of such autonomous but inter-connected armed militant groups operating within Pakistan*/ even if they were to stay largely localised in the Pashtun belt*/ is quite disturbing. Such forces may engage the state in a perpetual confrontation with a regressive force, and contribute to the fragility of the state machinery. This would make the army play a more central role and further strengthen its hold on power in Pakistan.
The world at large ought to help Pakistan avert the danger of a Pakistan chronically ''at war with itself''. 23 This can be achieved by helping Pakistan
Fighting the Taliban 539 revert to a participative political process where these assertive constituencies would be compelled to try out their strength in the theatre of electoral politics vis-a`-vis other mainstream political parties which have traditionally performed better in electoral contests. Simultaneously, the Pakistani state should initiate a silent revolution to mainstream the far-flung tribal areas economically. By connecting these areas to the heartland through all weather road networks, greater penetration of political parties 24 to these areas (the political parties are not allowed to operate in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 25 and by providing the people with access to liberal education (because the literacy rate in these areas is as low as 29.51% for males and 3% for women) 26 and by reforming the madrassa education system, the tide of Talibanisation that Musharraf underlined in Kabul can be reversed.
The Pakistani state will also have to ''rollback its paradigm'' 27 of using militancy for short-term gains in Kashmir, vis-a`-vis India. In fact, this policy of raising an unofficial armed group has boomeranged from when the Pakistani state made use of Al Qaeda training centres to train its cadres. The ideology of the Jihad guiding the militants in Kashmir morphed into an intensely sectarian, Deobandi-Wahabi creed when it was made to interact with the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the training camps in southern Afghanistan. The Jihad industry raised by Osama Bin Laden and encouraged by the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence has led to the production of many committed cadres for Jihad against everything they consider un-Islamic, according to their narrow sectarian view-point. This has also completely Talibanised the socio-political context in Pakistan.
The study by Kristian Berg Harpviken reveals that ''traditional modes of social organization'' 28 play a central role in the making of non-state actors with extensive war-making capacity in modern times. Even if the power structure in the tribal areas has changed 29 with substantial dilution of the authority of the tribal elders/leaders and triumph of the tribal mullahs in the wake of the prolonged propagation of jihadi culture since the initiation of Afghan Jihad in the early 1980s, the traditional communitarian principles continue to determine the nature of collective action in these societies. It would require tremendous effort on the part of the state to transform these societies from war-makingmachines to forward-looking rule-bound political entities. The process of transformation through increasing literacy, promoting participative local bodies integrated with the larger political system and accommodating the competing elite in the political process would require innovative socio-political and economic strategies. The process is difficult but not impossible.
Notes

